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Abstract
In this paper, we study risk-taking, scal policies, and asset pricing in
a stochastic model of growth with non-expected utility function and the
spirit of capitalism. With specic assumptions on the production technology,
preferences, and stochastic shocks, we derive the explicit solutions to the
growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all
assets. Finally, we give the e¤ects of scal policies, the spirit of capitalism,
and stochastic shocks on growth, asset pricing, and welfare.
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1 Introduction
In neoclassical growth models, the representative agent chooses a consump-
tion path to maximize his discounted utility, which is dened only on con-
sumption. This motive for wealth accumulation is often taken to be solely
driven by ones desire to increase consumption rewards. It is an important
motive, however, not the only one. Because man is a social animal, he also
accumulates wealth to gain prestige, social status, and power in the society;
see Frank (1985), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1995), Fershtman
and Weiss (1993), Zou (1994, 1995), Bakshi and Chen (1996), and Fersht-
man, Murphy and Weiss (1996). Earlier contributions include Duesenberry
(1948), Kurz (1968), and Spence (1974). In these wealth-is-status models,
the representative agent accumulates wealth not only for consumption but
also for wealth-induced status. Mathematically, in light of the new perspec-
tive, the utility function can be dened on both consumption, c, and wealth,
W : u(ct;Wt): In fact, these models is in line with the spirit of capitalism in
the sense of Weber (1958) and Keynes (1971): capitalists accumulate wealth
for the sake of wealth.
Many authors have used the wealth-is-status and the-spirit-of-capitalism
models to try to explain growth, savings, and asset pricing. Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (1992) have demonstrated how the presence of social status
leads to multiple equilibria in long-run growth. Zou (1994, 1995) has stud-
ied the spirit of capitalism and long-run growth and shows that a strong
capitalist spirit can lead to unbounded growth of consumption and capital
even under the neoclassical assumption of production technology. Bakshi
and Chen (1996) have explored empirically the relationship between the
spirit of capitalism and stock market pricing and o¤ered an attempt to-
wards the resolution of the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott
(1985). They have shown that when investors care about status they will be
more conservative in risk taking and more frugal in consumption spending.
Furthermore stock prices tend to be more volatile with the presence of the
spirit of capitalism.
As for the discussing of risk, scal policies, and growth, Eaton (1981),
Turnovsky (1993, 1995), Grinols and Turnovsky (1993, 1994), and Obstfeld
(1994) have introduced stochastic tax and stochastic government expendi-
ture into the continuous-time growth and asset-pricing models. Under spe-
cic assumptions on the production technology, preferences, and stochastic
shocks, they have derived explicit solutions to the growth rates of consump-
tion and savings and equilibrium returns on assets. And for the continuous-
time stochastic growth model with the role of social status and the spirit
of capitalism in capital accumulation, asset pricing, and growth, Gong and
Zou (2002) study the scal policies and asset pricing in a stochastic growth
model with the spirit of capitalism.
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Turn to the literature on non-expected utility function, Epstein and Zin
(1989, 1991) and Weil (1990) have used it to analysis the asset pricing theory,
Obstfeld (1994) developed a continuous-time model in which international
risk-sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its e¤ect on expected
consumption growth. Yang (1998) used the stochastic asset pricing model
with non-expected utility function and the social status to explain the equity
premium puzzle.
Among the enormous literatures, there was seldom paper to discuss the
risk, scal policies, growth, and social status with the spirit of capitalism and
non-expected utility function. This paper integrates these three trends of
growth and asset-pricing literature,non-expected utility function, and con-
siders social status, scal policies, and asset pricing in a stochastic model
of growth. With specic assumptions on the production technology, pref-
erences, and stochastic shocks, it gives the explicit solutions to the growth
rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all assets. Fur-
thermore, it demonstrates how scal policies, social status, the spirit of cap-
italism, and stochastic shocks a¤ect economic growth and asset pricing.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a modied
growth and asset-pricing framework as in Turnovsky (1995), Bakshi and
Chen (1996), and Gong and Zou (2002). In section 3, we derive the optimal
conditions for macroeconomic equilibrium. In section 4, using a specic
utility function, we present explicit solutions to the consumption-wealth
ratio, the mean growth rate of the economy, and the expected real return on
bonds and capital. In section 5, we discuss the e¤ects of stochastic shocks
and scal policies on the economy. In section 6, we discuss the e¤ects of
the concern for social status or the spirit of capitalism on asset pricing and
growth. We conclude the paper in section 7.
2 The Model
Along with Eaton (1981) and Turnovsky (1995), we assume output Y and
government expenditure G to be proportional to the mean-level output, i.e.
dY = Kdt+ Kdy; (1)
dG = gKdt+ Kdz; (2)
where  and g are positive constants.
Equation (1) asserts that the accumulated ow of output over the period
(t; t + dt), given by the right-hand side of this equation, consists of two
components. The deterministic component is described as the rst term
on the right hand, which is the rms production technology and has been
specied as a linear production function. The second part is the stochastic
component, which can be viewed as the shock to the production and assumed
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to be temporally independent, normally distributed, and
E(dy) = 0; V ar(dy) = 2ydt:
In equation (2), the deterministic part of government expenditure is ex-
pressed in terms of a fraction of mean output, and government expenditure
has the stochastic shock dz. It is further assumed that dz is temporally
independent, normally distributed, and
E(dz) = 0; V ar(dz) = 2zdt:
Following Fischer (1975) and Turnovsky (1995), it is assumed that there
are two assets in the economy: government bonds, B and the capital stock,
K. It is postulated, as in Turnovsky (1995) that the stochastic real rate of
return on bonds, dRB, over a period dt, is given by
dRB = rBdt+ duB; (3)
where rB and duB will be determined endogenously in the macroeconomic
equilibrium.
Turning to the second asset, capital, and using the production technology
in equation (1), the stochastic real rate of return on capital is
dRK =
dY
K
= dt+ dy = rKdt+ duK : (4)
Thus wealth Wt is the sum of the holdings of Bt and Kt, i.e.,
Wt = Bt +Kt:
Let nBand nK denote the fractions of wealth invested in bonds, nominal
bonds, and capital, respectively, i.e.,
nB =
Bt
Wt
; nK =
Kt
Wt
;
and nB + nK = 1.
We may assume that, without any loss of generality, taxes are levied on
capital income and consumption, namely,
dT = (rKK +  cc)dt+ 
0KduK = (K +  cct)dt+  0Kdy; (5)
where  and  0 are the tax rates on the deterministic component of capital
income and the stochastic capital income, respectively, and  c is the tax rate
on consumption.
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Suppose the utility depends upon consumption and wealth, savings be-
havior is determined by the consumers impatience, risk aversion, and will-
ings to substitute consumption over time, and the utility function satisfy
f((1 R)u(ct;Wt)) = (1 R)u(ct;Wt)t
+e tf((1 R)Etu(ct+t;Wt+t)); (6)
where the function f(x) is given by
f(x) =
1 R
1   x
1 
1 R : (7)
The recursive form in equation (6) is similar to the function form presented
by Obstfeld (1994). It states that current utility depends the current con-
sumption level ct; the current wealth levelWt; and the expected future utility
Etu(ct+t;Wt+t): Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on the
information before time t: u(ct;Wt) is the intra-period utility function, which
depends upon current consumption level and the current wealth level. R > 0
is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion with respect to timeless gambles
over xt:  > 0 is the rate of time preference.
If we select the intra-period utility function u(ct;Wt) as
u(ct;Wt) =
c1 t
1  W
 
t ; (8)
where 1= > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution dened over
riskless paths of xt, jj measures the investors concern with his social sta-
tus or measures his spirit of capitalism. The larger the parameter jj, the
stronger the agents spirit of capitalism or concern for social status.  and
 satisfy that:  > 0, and   0 when   1, and  1 <  < 0; otherwise.
The e¤ective coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion can be dened as
ERRA = 1  1     
1   (1 R)
and we require ERRA > 0:
If there were no spirit of capitalism, then  = 0, and we have the version
of generalized isoelastic preferences introduced by Svensson (1989), if we
further specialize the model without the a spirit of capitalism by imposing
time-separability (R = ), then ERRA = ; and maximizing (6) is reduced
to
maxE0
Z 1
0
u(ct)e
 tdt
which was discussed by Turnovsky and Eaton, et al.
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Next, if we were maintain time separability, but allow a spirit of capital-
ism, then ERRA =  + ; and maximizing (6) is equivalent to
maxE0
Z 1
0
u(ct;Wt)e
 tdt
which discussed by Gong and Zou (2002).
Now the representative agent chooses the consumption-wealth ratio, c=W ,
the portfolio shares, nB; and nK to maximize his expected utility subject to
the budget constraint, i.e.,
maxU(ct;Wt)
subject to
dWt = (nBWtrB + nKWt(1  )rK   (1 +  c)ct)dt+Wtdw; (9)
nB + nK = 1; (10)
with the given initial stocks of nominal bonds B(0) and capital K(0):
Where we denote U(ct;Wt) the utility function satises equation (6), wt
is stochastic shock of wealth, and it is given as
dw = nBduB + nK(1   0)duK : (11)
3 Macroeconomic equilibrium
As in Turnovsky (1995) and Gong and Zou (2002), the economic system in
equilibrium determines the rates of consumption and savings, the value of
returns on all assets, and the economic growth rate.
The exogenous variables include the preference parameters, technology
parameters, and government scal policies including government expendi-
ture g, tax rates  ;  0, and  c. The exogenous stochastic processes consist of
government expenditure, dz; and productivity shocks, dy, which are taken
to be mutually uncorrelated. The remaining stochastic disturbances real
rates of returns on bonds, duB; and total wealth, dw; are both endogenous
and will be determined by the economic system. The remaining endoge-
nous variables include the following: the consumption-wealth ratio, c=W ,
the mean growth rate of the economy, the expected real returns on two as-
sets, rB; and rK , respectively, and the corresponding portfolio shares nB
and nK .
To solve the agents optimization problem, we introduce the value func-
tion
V (W (t); t) = maxU(ct;Wt)
subject to equations (9) and (10).
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If we dene V (W; t) = e tX(W ), we know that the value function for
this problem obeys the recursion
f((1 R)X(Wt)) = lim
t!0
max
ct;nB ;nK
f(1 R)u(ct;Wt)t
+e tf((1 R)EtX(Wt+t))g (12)
subject to the equations (9) and (10).
Now, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The rst-order conditions for the optimization problem can
be written as follows:
@u(c;W )
@c
= (1 R)f 0((1 R)X(W ))(1 +  c)XW ; (13)
(rBX
0(W )W   )dt+ cov(dw; duB)X 00(W )W 2 = 0; (14)
((1  )rKX 0(W )W   )dt+ cov(dw; (1   0)duK)X 00(W )W 2 = 0; (15)
nB + nK = 1; (10)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the portfolio selection
constraint (10). Furthermore, the optimal solutions of the problem must
satisfy the Bellman equation
(1 R)u(ct;Wt)  f((1 R)X(Wt))
+(1 R)f 0((1 R)X(Wt))f(  (1 +  c) ct
Wt
)WtX
0(Wt) (16)
+
1
2
2wW
2
t X
00(Wt)g = 0;
where  = nBrB + nK(1  )rK ; and it is the expected net-of-tax return on
total asset holdings.
See Appendix for the proof of proposition 1.
Condition (13) asserts that in the equilibrium the marginal utility of
consumption must equal the marginal utility of wealth; conditions (14) and
(15) are the asset pricing relationships; condition (10) is the portfolio selec-
tion constraint; and equation (16) is the Bellman equation, from which we
will solve the value function X(W ).
In order to determine the full equilibrium system, we follow Turnovsky
(1995) in discussing government behavior. Equations (2) and (5) describe
government expenditure policy and tax policies, both of which are propor-
tional to current output. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, government
budget constraint can be described as:
dB = BdRB + dG  dT: (17)
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From equations (2) and (5), equation (17) can be written in the form
nB
dB
B
= (rBnB+ c
c
W
+(g )nK)dt+nBduB+nKdz  0nKdy: (18)
The equilibrium product market requires
dK = dY   cdt  dG; (19)
where G follows the stochastic process of equation (2). Now we have
Proposition 2 The equilibrium system of the economy can be summarized
as equations (10), (13)-(15), the Bellman equation (16), and
dK
K
= [(1  g)  c
nKW
]dt+ (dy   dz)  dt+ (dy   dz): (20)
with the transversality condition (TVC) plus the initial conditions.
Furthermore, the stochastic component of real rate of return on bonds,
duB; and total wealth, dw, are determined by:
dw = (dy   dz); (21)
duB =

nB
[(1  nK(1   0))dy   dz]: (22)
Proof: Equation (20) can be derive directly from equations (1), (2), and
(19). Because of the intertemporal constancy of portfolio shares, we have
that all the real assets grow at a common stochastic rate, i.e.,
dW
W
=
dK
K
=
dB
B
; (23)
Combing with equations (9), (18), (20), and (23), we get
dw = nBduB + nK(1   0)dy = (dy   dz)
=
1
nB
[nBduB + nK(dz    0dy)]:
From the equations above, and noticing the fact nB + nK = 1, it is easy to
get dw and duB. Q.E.D.
Equations (20)-(22) enable us to compute all the necessary covariances
and variances in the full equilibrium system. Equation (21) implies that the
stochastic shocks of government expenditure and production determine the
stochastic rate of return on bonds.
8
4 An explicit example
Specify the utility function given in equation (8), and we have
Proposition 3 For the special utility function (8), the rst-order optimal
conditions for the optimization problem are
ct
Wt
=
 (1  )  1
2
2w(1  )( 1  1  (1 R) 1)
(1+c)(
1  
1  )
; (24)
(rB   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
)dt = ERRAcov(dw; duB); (25)
((1  )rK   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
)dt = ERRAcov(dw; (1   0)duK); (26)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (10),
 = nBrB + nK(1  )rK ;
dw = nBduB + nK(1   0)duK ;
2w = n
2
B
2
B + n
2
K(1   0)22K + 2nBnK(1   0)BK :
Equation (24) gives the consumption-wealth ratio. For a logarithmic utility
function in consumption, i.e.,  = 1, we get c=W = . Therefore, the
consumption-wealth ratio is always equal to the time discount rate. If  6=
1, then the e¤ect of an increase in the expected net-of-tax return on the
consumption-wealth ratio will be
d( cW )
d
=
1  1=
(1 +  c)
:
which is similar to the conclusion of Gong and Zou (2002). Therefore, an in-
crease in the expected net-of-tax return  will raise the consumption-wealth
ratio if 1= < 1, and lower it otherwise. This can be explained as follows.
When 1= < 1; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1=; is rela-
tively small. The representative agent will increase current consumption
more than investment and wealth. On the other hand, when 1= > 1, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is relatively large, and the agent will
increase wealth holding more than consumption.
Similar analysis holds for the e¤ect of the variance of wealth, 2w; on
c=W :
d( cW )
d2w
=
1
2
ERRA
(1 +  c)
1
1 
:
Therefore, an increase in the variance of wealth reduces the consumption-
wealth ratio when  > 1, and increases the ratio when  < 1.
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Equations (25) and (26) illustrates the asset pricing relationships. The
term of W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
in equation (25) implies that the return on bonds is
equal to the riskless return plus a risk premium, which is proportional to
the covariance between total wealth and bonds. Similarly, in equation (26),
for the net return on the risky capital, it is also equal to the riskless return
plus a risk premium, which is also proportional to the covariance between
total wealth and risky capital. In the absence of risk, these three equations
imply that the net returns on the three assets are all equal.
Since  is still endogenous in terms of holding shares for various assets,
we now use the full equilibrium system to derive explicit solutions to c=W;
nB; nK ; rB; and . With proposition 3, and from the optimal conditions
(21) and (22) plus equation (18), we have:
2w = 
2(2y + 
2
z)dt;
cov(dw; duB) =
2
nB
[(1  nK(1   0))2y + 2z]dt;
cov(dw; (1   0)duK) = 2(1   0)2ydt:
and
Proposition 4 The mean return on bonds and the stochastic growth rate
of the economy are
rB = (1  ) 
1  
1  (1 R) 1
nB
2( 02y + 
2
z); (27)
 =
rBnB + (g   )nK +  c cW
nB
=   (1 +  c) c
W
: (28)
The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (27) is the net (after-tax)
return on capital, which is the same as in Turnovsky (1995); the second term
on the right-hand side is the stochastic component of the return on bonds.
With proposition 5, we now have our main theorem of this section:
Theorem 1 The explicit solutions of the economy system are
c
W
= 
(1+c)(
1  
1  )
  (1 ) 
1
2
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)2((2 0 1)2y+2z)
(1+c)(
1
1  )
; (29)
 = (1  )  2(1  1  (1 R)  1)( 02y + 2z)  (1 +  c)
c
W
; (30)
nK =
c=W
( g)+(1+c)c=W+2( 1  1  (1 R) 1)( 02y+2z)
; (31)
nB = 1  nK ;
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and the TVC
lim
t!1E(W
1  
1  (1 R)e t) = 0: (32)
Proof: Notice the conditions
nB + nK = 1;
 = nBrB + nKrK(1  );
rB = (1  ) +
1  
1  (1 R) 1
nB
2( 02y + 
2
z):
We obtain
 = (1  ) + 2(1  1  (1 R)  1)( 02y + 2z):
Thus, we have equations (29) and (30). With equation (17), we have
 = (1  g)  c
nKW
;
and equation (31).
Q.E.D.
With equation (31), the portfolio shares of government bonds are deter-
mined as a residual from the portfolio-selection constraint nK + nB = 1:
Please also note that the transversality condition (32) can be shown to
be equivalent to c=W > 0. In fact, since
dW = Wdt+Wdw;
we have
W (t) = W (0)e( 
1
2
2w)t+w(t) w(0):
The TVC will be met if
lim
t!1E(e
(  1
2
2w)
1  
1  (1 R)te t) = 0:
Equation (32) can be met for a positive consumption-wealth ratio and
1  
1  (1 R) < 0.
5 Comparative dynamics
Now we discuss how stochastic shocks (in production and government spend-
ing) and government scal policies a¤ect the equilibrium.
E¤ects of stochastic shocks
Di¤erentiating with respect to 2z and 
2
y; respectively, in equation (29),
we have for  > 1,  0 < 50%
@c=W
@2z
=
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)2
2(1+c)(

1  )
> 0;
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@c=W
@2y
=
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)(2 0 1)2
2(1+c)(

1  )
< 0:
Therefore, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively
small, a higher variance in government expenditure increases the consumption-
wealth ratio, whereas the stochastic shock in production lowers the consumption-
wealth ratio.
On the other hand, when  < 1, we have just the opposite results,
namely,
@c=W
@2z
=
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)2
2(1+c)(

1  )
< 0;
@c=W
@2y
=
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)(2 0 1)2
2(1+c)(

1  )
> 0:
From equation (30), the equilibrium growth rate, , varies with the sto-
chastic shocks of government spending as follows. For all values of ;
@
@2z
=  1
2
2(1  1  (1 R)  1)(1 + 1 ) < 0;
because ERRA > 0: Therefore, more volatility in government spending al-
ways increases the rate of economic growth. This is true because an increase
in 2z raises the risk of bonds. The agent reduces his holding of govern-
ment bonds and invests more in capital, which in turn leads to more output
growth.
But for the shocks to the productivity, take di¤erentiate on equation
(29), we have
@
@2y
=  1
2
2(1  1  (1 R)  1)2
0 1+
 < 0:
Thus, the mean growth rate of the economy can increase or decrease de-
pending on the values of  and other parameters. For example, when  > 1;
we have @
@2y
> 0; when  < 1; the e¤ects of the variance of the productivity
shocks on the mean growth rate is ambiguous, when  0 < 1 2 ; the e¤ects
is positive, while  0 > 1 2 ; the e¤ects is negative. Our results conrm the
complicated pictures of the e¤ects of stochastic shocks on output growth in
Obstfeld (1994) and Turnovsky (1995).
The dependence of the shares of asset holding on the stochastic shocks
can be derived from equation (31):
@nK
@2z
= nKf [1 nK(1+c)]@(c=W )=@
2
z
c=W   2(1  1  (1 R)  1)
nk
c=W
g;
@nK
@2y
= nKf [1 nK(1+c)]@(c=W )=@
2
y
c=W  
nK
c=W
2(1  1  (1 R)  1) 0g:
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The rst equation above tells us that the stochastic shock in government
expenditure will enhance the holding of risky capital for  > 1. In the second
equation the e¤ect of the stochastic shock in production on the holding of
risky capital is ambiguous. As for the holding shares of government bonds,
nB and nD, we can use the portfolio-selection condition and derive their
responses to various shocks and scal policies. We leave the exercise to the
reader.
We have derived the value function X(W ) in appendix B. Let W (0)
denote the initial stock of wealth: We have the following welfare function:
X(W (0)) = W (0)
1  
1  (1 R);
where
 = (1 +  c)
1= 1 R
1 1= (1  1  )
1= 1 R
1 1= (1 R) 1( ct
Wt
)
1 R
1 1= :
However, W (0) is itself endogenously determined by
W (0) =
K0
nK
:
Therefore, with some simple manipulations, welfare is given by:
X(K0) = n
+ 1
1  (1 R)
K (1+ c)
1 R
 1 (1  1  )
1 R
 1 (1 R) 1( ct
Wt
)
1 R
1 1=K
1  
1  (1 R)
0 ;
(33)
where c=W and nK are determined as in Theorem 1. Taking di¤erentiation
in equation (33), we get
dX
X
= + 11  (1 R)
dnK
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
d(c=W )
c=W
: (34)
Now we have
@X
@2z
= + 11  (1 R)
X@nK=@
2
z
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
X@(c=W )=@2z
c=W
;
@X
@2y
= + 11  (1 R)
X@nK=@
2
y
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
X@(c=W )=@2y
c=W
:
These equations imply that the e¤ects on welfare of the stochastic shocks in
government expenditure and production are ambiguous.
E¤ects of scal policies
Now we turn to how taxes on capital income and consumption impact
on the equilibrium.
First, di¤erentiating all endogenous variables with respect to the tax on
the deterministic part of capital income,  ; in equations (29), (30), and (31),
we have
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d(c=W )
d
=
(1  )
(1 +  c)
;
d
d
=  = < 0;
dnK
d
= nKf(1  nK(1 +  c))@(c=W )=@
c=W
   nK
c=W
g;
dX
d
= Xf+ 11  (1 R)
@nK=@
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
@(c=W )=@
c=W
g:
If  = 1, c=W is independent of the tax rate, because in this case c=W =
; which is independent of  . When 0 <  < 1, we notice that a rise in the
taxation on the deterministic component of capital income has an ambiguous
e¤ect on welfare. But, it is clear that
d(c=W )
d
> 0;
d
d
< 0:
Therefore, a higher tax on the deterministic component of capital income
will increase the consumption-wealth ratio and decrease the economic growth
rate. This can be explained as follows: a higher tax on capital income will
lower the return on capital. As the agent switches away from capital to bonds
and consumption, this reduces capital accumulation, lowers the growth rate,
and increases the consumption-wealth ratio.
When  > 1, we still nd that capital income taxation reduces the
holding share of risky capital and lowers the growth rate:
d
d
< 0;
dnK
d
< 0:
But it reduces the consumption-wealth ratio: d(c=W )d < 0:
Second, we look at the e¤ects on the equilibrium of the tax on the sto-
chastic component of capital income:
@(c=W )
@ 0
=
( 1  
1  (1 R) 1)22y
(1+c)(

1  )
;
@
@ 0
=  2((1     
1   )(1 R)  1)
2
y
1

> 0;
@nK
@ 0
= nK
1 nK(1+c)
c=W
@(c=W )
@ 0
+ 2(1  1  (1 R)  1)2y
n2K
c=W
;
@X
@ 0
= X + 11  (1 R)
@nK=@
0
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
X@(c=W )=@ 0
c=W
:
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These results are very similar to the ones for the tax on the deterministic
component of capital income. Still,
@(c=W )
@ 0
< 0;
@
@ 0
> 0;
when 0 <  < 1; and
@(c=W )
@ 0
> 0;
@
@ 0
> 0;
@nk
@ 0
> 0;
when  > 1.
Finally, we examine the e¤ects of the consumption tax on the equilib-
rium. Recall that from the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, the consumption
tax does not a¤ect the rate of economic growth and long-run capital accu-
mulation. In the long run, it only crowds out private consumption. Here we
have
@(c=W )
@ c
=   c=W
1 +  c
< 0:
That is to say, increasing the consumption tax will reduce the consumption-
wealth ratio because a higher consumption tax decreases private consump-
tion directly, and the agent has more money to invest in capital and bonds,
which in turn increases wealth. Therefore, the consumption-wealth ratio
decreases as a result of a higher consumption tax.
For the growth rate, a rise in the consumption tax results in
@
@ c
=   c
W
+ (1 +  c)
c=W
1 +  c
= 0:
Hence, the consumption tax rate has no e¤ects on the growth rate.
As for welfare, we have
@X
@ c
= + 11  (1 R)
X@nK=@ c
nK
+
1 R
1  1=
X@(c=W )=@ c
c=W
  X
1 +  c
:
Therefore, @X@c < 0 when  > 1. The explanation is simple. Since the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution is small, current consumption will not
be severely cut as a result of a consumption tax, whereas current investment
in assets is reduced. In the long run, the agent will accumulate less assets
and earn less income. His consumption and asset holdings are all reduced
in the long run. Since welfare is dened on both consumption and wealth
accumulation, his long-run welfare is also lower. For  < 1, the welfare ef-
fect of a consumption tax is ambiguous because the direct e¤ect of a higher
consumption tax reduces consumption. But with a larger elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution the agent may increase his asset holdings, which
in turn can lead to more asset accumulation and more income. This rising
income can give rise to more long-run consumption. Again since the agents
welfare is dened on both consumption and asset holdings, his welfare may
also rise in this case.
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6 E¤ects of the spirit of capitalism
In this section, we will discuss how the spirit of capitalism or the concern
for social status a¤ects asset pricing and economic growth.
First, we give the equilibrium asset-pricing relationships. Following
Turnovsky (1995), we dene the market portfolio as Q = nBW + nKW ,
and the return rate on the market portfolio as
rQ   = rBnB + rK(1  )nK :
Now we have
Proposition 5 The equilibrium asset-pricing relationships are
ri   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
= i(rQ   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
);
where i = B;K,
B =
cov(dw; duB)
var(dw)
=
(1  nK(1   0))2y + 2z
nB(2y + 
2
z)
;
K =
cov(dw; duK)
var(dw)
=
(1   0)2y
2y + 
2
z
:
Proof: From equations (26) and (27), we have
W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
= (1  ) + (1  1  (1 R)  1)2(1   0)2y;
and
rQ = (1  )  (1  1  (1 R)  1)2( 02y + 2z):
So, we obtain
rQ   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
= (1  1  (1 R)  1)2(2y + 2z);
and using proposition 3 we get the conclusion. Q.E.D.
Again W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
is equal to the return on the riskless, nominal bonds,
rD: Equation (44) indicates that the returns on risky assets (bonds and
capital) are given by the familiar consumption-based capital asset pricing
model with rQ as the return on the market portfolio.
Furthermore, if we dene the return on the market portfolio in the ab-
sence of the spirit of capitalism as rQ, then, in our denition of the return
of the market portfolio rQ; we set  = 0. Hence
rQ = (1  ) +R2( 02y + 2z):
16
This is just the return on the market portfolio in Turnovsky (1995). At the
same time, we have
WR 1
(1 R) = (1  ) R2(1   0)2y:
Hence, we obtain the asset-pricing relationships as
ri   WR 1(1 R) = i(rQ   W
R 1
(1 R) ): (35)
Because rQ < rQ, simple calculations yield
ri   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
> ri   WR 1(1 R) : (36)
Equation (45) implies that, with the spirit of capitalism, the gap between the
returns on risky assets and the return on the risk-free asset will be enlarged.
Like Bakshi and Chen (1996), our ndings can be used to partially explain
the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
For the growth rate, social welfare, and portfolio selection, we have
Proposition 6 The e¤ects of the spirit of capitalism on c=W; nK ; ; and
X are as follows
@(c=W )
@
= (1 )(1 R)2(1+c) 
2(2y + 
2
z) +
(1 )
(1  )2(1+c)
+ (1 )(1 R)(1+c) 
2( 02y + 
2
z);
@
@
= 2
1 R
1   (
02y + 
2
z)  (1 )(1 R)2 2(2y + 2z)
  (1 )
(1  )2   (1 )(1 R) 2( 02y + 2z);
@nK
nK@
= (1  (1 +  c)nK)@(c=W )=@
c=W
+
nK
c=W
2( 02y+2z)
1  (1 R);
@X
@
= + 11  (1 R)
X@nK=@
nK
+
1 R
1  
X@(c=W )=@
c=W
:
If R < 1; and  > 1, we have  > 0. Then
@
@
> 0;
@nK
@
> 0:
Similarly, if R < 1, and  < 1, we have  < 0. In this case jj measures the
spirit of capitalism, and
@
@( ) > 0;
@nK
@( ) > 0:
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Therefore, an increase in the spirit of capitalism will always increase the
growth rate and the holding share of risky capital. With a strong spirit of
capitalism, the agent cares more about his social status and the power of
wealth, and will accumulate more wealth and take more risk in investment
in order to improve his social status.
If we further impose the condition that  0 < 12(1  2z=2y), then
@c=W
@
< 0;
@X
@
> 0;
when R < 1;  > 1; and  > 0: Furthermore, with the same condition
on the tax rate on the stochastic component of capital income, i.e.,  0 <
1
2(1  2z=2y);
@c=W
@( ) < 0;
@X
@( ) > 0:
when R < 1;  < 1 and  < 0:Given the assumption on the tax rate, a strong
spirit of capitalism always reduces the consumption-wealth ratio. Since the
agents utility is dened on both consumption and wealth accumulation, his
long-run welfare rises as a result of higher wealth and possibly even higher
consumption.
When R > 1; the e¤ects of the spirit of capitalism on the consumption-
wealth ratio, growth rate, asset holding share, and the welfare are ambiguous
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the existing frameworks of stochastic growth
and asset pricing to stochastic growth framework with non-expected utility
function, the spirit of capitalism and concern for social status are discussed
also. In this extended model, we have studied how stochastic shocks in
production and government spending a¤ects consumption, wealth accumu-
lation, economic growth, and welfare. This paper has further extended the
studies by Eaton, Grinols, Obstfeld, Turnovsky, and Gong and Zou, among
others, to consider the impact of various taxes on the consumption-wealth
ratio, growth, and welfare.
The direct e¤ect of the spirit of capitalism on the economy has been
also explicitly considered in this paper. It is shown that the existence of
the spirit of capitalism can better explain the di¤erence between the rates
of return on government bonds and risky stock the Mehra-Prescott risk-
premium puzzle. In the spirit-of-capitalism or wealth-is-status model, the
gap between the returns on risky assets and the risk-free asset is always
larger. Furthermore, a higher spirit of capitalism or a stronger concern for
social status can lead to higher output growth, more holding of risky capital,
higher welfare, and a lower consumption-wealth ratio.
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Appendix
Consider the optimization problem:
maxU(ct;Wt)
subject to
dWt
Wt
= (  (1 +  c) ct
Wt
)dt+ dwt; (A1)
where the utility function satises
f((1 R)u(ct;Wt)) = 1 R
1   c
1 
t W
 
t t+ e
 tf((1 R)u(ct+t;Wt+t));
(A2)
and
f(x) =
1 R
1   x
1 
1 R ; (A3)
 = nBrB + nK(1  )rK ; (A4)
dw = nBduB + nK(1   0)duK : (A5)
From equation (A5), we have
2w = n
2
B
2
B + n
2
K(1   0)22K + 2nBnK(1   0)BK : (A6)
To solve the problem, we dene the value function V (W; t); and
V (W; t) = e tX(W )
The Lagrangian function associated with the problem is:
maxfu(ct;Wt)  f((1 R)X(Wt))
+(1 R)f 0((1 R)X(Wt))((  (1 +  c) ct
Wt
)WtX
0(Wt) +
1
2
2wW
2
t X
00(Wt))
+(1  nB   nK)g: (A7)
In this case, the corresponding rst-order conditions for maximization are:
@u(c;W )
@c
= (1 R)f 0((1 R)X(W ))(1 +  c)X 0(W ); (A8)
(rBX
0(W )W   )dt+ cov(dw; duB)X 00(W )W 2 = 0; (A9)
((1  )rKX 0(W )W   )dt+ cov(dw; (1   0)duK)X 00(W )W 2 = 0; (A10)
nB + nK = 1: (A11)
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These equations determine the optimal choices of c=W , nB, nK , and  as
the functions of X 0(W ) and X 00(W ). Furthermore, the value function must
satisfy the Bellman equation
u(ct;Wt)  f((1 R)X(Wt))
+(1 R)f 0((1 R)X(Wt))f(  (1 +  c) ct
Wt
)WtX
0(Wt)
+
1
2
2wW
2
t X
00(Wt)g = 0:
Now we have completed the proof of proposition 1.
For the specied utility function (8), the form of the value function is
postulated as:
X(W ) = W
1  
1  (1 R); (A12)
where  is to be determined.
Di¤erentiating with respect to W yields
X 0(W ) = (1  1  )(1 R)W
1  
1  (1 R) 1;
X 00(W ) = (1  1  )(1 R)(1  1  (1 R)  1)W
1  
1  (1 R) 2:
Substituting for c in the Bellman equation (A13) leads to
ct
Wt
= (1 R) 1 1=1 R  1 1=1 R (1 +  c) 1=(1     
1   )
 1= : (A13)
So, we get

1 1=
1 R =
 (1  )  1
2
2w(1  )( 1  1  (1 R) 1))
(1 R)
1 1=
1 R (1+c)1 1=( 1  1  )
1 1=
: (A14)
Thus
ct
Wt
=
 (1  )  1
2
2w(1  )( 1  1  (1 R) 1))
(1+c)(
1  
1  )
;
(rB(
1  
1  )(1 R)W
1  
1  (1 R)   )dt
+cov(dw; duB)(
1  
1  )(1 R)(1  1  (1 R)  1)W
1  
1  (1 R) = 0;
((1  )rK(1  1  )(1 R)W
1  
1  (1 R)   )dt
+cov(dw; (1   0)duK)(1  1  )(1 R)(1  1  (1 R)  1)W
1  
1  (1 R) = 0:
Thus, we have obtained all the expressions in proposition 4:
ct
Wt
=
 (1  )  1
2
2w(1  )( 1  1  (1 R) 1))
(1+c)(
1  
1  )
; (A15)
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(rB   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
)dt+ cov(dw; duB)(
1  
1  (1 R)  1) = 0; (A16)
((1  )rK   W
1  
1  (R 1)
( 1  
1  )(1 R)
)dt+ cov(dw; (1   0)duK)(1  1  (1 R) 1) = 0:
(A17)
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